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0. Introduction 
Since Montague (1973), semantic theories have received precise implementations 
as algorithms that rranslate linguistic expressions compositionally into a logical 
hmguage. Particularly troublesome for this strategy have been DONKEY sentences: 
(1). If a man owns a donkey, he beats it. 
The meanings of donkey sentences cannot be captured using a procedure which, 
like Montague's, uses the existential quantifiers of classical logic to translate in" 
definites and the variables to translate pronouns. The treatment of these examples 
requires meanings which dcpcmi on the context in which sentences appear, and 
thus necessitates a logic which models this context to some extent. If context is 
represented as the information conveyed in discourse, and the meanings of pronouns 
are enriched to depend on this information, the result is the approach (ETA) 
adapted by I kim ( 1990) from proposals in Evans (1980) and Cooper ( 1979). If the 
context is represented as a list of potential referents, and the of indefinites 
are enriched to introduce new referents into this list, the result is a compositional 
formulation like Groenendijk and Stokhof's ( 1990) of the discourse representation 
theory (ORT) of Kamp ( 1981) and I leim ( 1982). Either tack suffices to capture the 
way in which the referents of he and it systematically correspond to the alternative 
possibilities described by the antecedent. 
Disjunction offers a parallel way of introducing alternatives in the antecedent 
of a conditional, as shuw11 Lil 12 ). 
(2). If Mary secs John nr BIil, she waves to him. 
It is na!llral to expect that berausC' they exploir the same insight in acrnunting for 
( lJ ETA and DRT would generalize equally well to an account for (2)" This is not 
the ca,e. The ETA encoding of context and pronoun meaning straightforwardly 
predicts the anaphora in disjunctive conditionals, once the obvious meaning for or 
is provided. In contrast, DRT can only explain (2) by adopting the operations on 
objects native to ETA" This distinction between tht: two approaches is a fundamental 
consequence of the diffen:nce in the mechanics and representations of the two 
,ystems, so the ability of ETA to generalize to disjunction ronstitutcs a strong 
argumrnt in its favor. 
1This research w:1s SU{llX.Hle,J by NS~ grant BNS '!O" l·lh7(>. Its turmulallon l>t;nclits from 
discussions v. 1th Harry Deutsch. f'aulme Jacobson, and Bar bar;, Pml<'f" In addi11or1, I have attempted 
to adr1rcss in sarwus place., comrm·nts v.lllch Jerocn GrocnrndtJk 1irornl,:rl at il1t' conlcrcnce" 
1. Heirn's ETA 
I initiate the argumentation that establishes this with a sketch of ETA and DRT that 
highlights the properties of the representation and use of context important later 
on. (A comprehensive exposition of the two systems is beyond the scope of this 
presentation, but the interested reader is referred to Heim l 990 or Chierchia 1992.) 
I turn first to ETA. 
Heim 's ETA encodes context as information using an important innovation in 
the model structure of logic: a set of indices called SITUATIONS. A situation is a 
representation of part of a world, or of a partial collection of facts about the world, 
which serves as a background against which to evaluate the truth of a formula. As 
with the indices of modal logics. the interpretation of predicates and relations can 
vary across situations, but because situations are partial, the values of predicates 
and relations may be undefined for some objects, rather than true or false. As 
information grows. propositions whose truth-value is undefined are resolved to true 
or false. So, like possible worlds, situations are linked by accessibility, but now 
accessibility encodes growth of information rather than alternative possibility. That 
is, the situation I is accessible from i when the information contained in j is an 
augmentation of the information contained in 1. This structure among indices allows 
finer distinctions to be made than are made in classical logic. In fact, when Barwise 
and Perry (l 981, 1983) first introduced situations to solve linguistic problems, it 
was to use this added structure to correctly distinguish propositions which receive 
identical interpretations in classical logic. 
The precise logic of situations depends on several choices about indices and 
the relations between them, for which alternative positions give rise to distinct 
but consistent formulations. For example, different proposals have been made for 
the way in which the falsehood of a proposition in a simation is to be determined. 
Likewise, variations in ideas about indices distinguish several models of information 
growth. Heim has in mind the system in Kratzer (1988). Here situations do not 
contain negative facts; falsehood is established when the truth of a fact is ruled out 
in every extension of an information state. Meanwhile, each situation can extend 
only to a single total information state, that of its world. 
These stands are vital in understanding the specifics of Heim 's proposal, but the 
predictions of ETA carry over when alternative positions are taken. Despite their 
differences, each variant reflects a common intuitive understanding of situations 
which alone is vital to the success of Heim 's ETA. It rests on two ideas. First, whether 
they are bunches of facts or pieces of worlds, situations are abstract structures finely 
discriminated (Kratzer l 988:612-6 I 4). In particular, situations can specify facts 
about an individual at a particular place and time without necessarily specifying 
other facts about that individual or about what else may be happening then and 
there. Second, despite their partiality, a situation specifies simple facts much as 
a world does, and no others. Complex propositions, such as those generated by 
disjunction, quantification, and modal operators, are not separately and explicitly 
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encoded into a situation: as in classical logic, their truth in a situation is determined 
by the truth of simple facts there and the ways in which that situation is related to 
others. Hence, complex patterns are represented only implicitly (Landman 1986). 
With this model structure, the meaning of a sentential formula remains a 
function from indices to truth values, as it is in modal logics. However, situations 
have been adopted in part because they allow the identification of them meaning of a 
proposition with a simpler set; the MINIMAL situations which verify it. Here is why. 
Information grows consistently, so once a formula is known to hold in a situation, it 
must hold in all situations accessible to it by the growth of information. This fact is 
known as the persistence of propositions. Consider the set of pieces of information 1 
which have the property that Jl is true in i without being true given any proper subset 
of the information in i. It follows from persistence that every supersituation of an 
element in this set verifies 11. Moreover, only such situations do, because whenever 
a situation verifies /1, removal of information ultimately yields an element of this 
set. Thus, there is a one to one correspondence between propositions and these sets, 
their minimal situations. Simple facts will have only a single minimal situation 
in each world; but as explained in more detail below, facts derived from logical 
operations such as existential quantification will require many minimal situations. 
For a contradiction, the set of minimal situations which verify it is empty. I'll denote 
the minimal situations of a proposition 11 as /l(JI). 
With this architecture of situations, the information communicated in a dis-
course can be treated simply as the conjunction of the propositions which make it 
up. Such a context, I{, always identifies a unique set of minimal situations, /t(ii). 
This equivalence permits a natural realization of the relativized salient descriptions 
that Heim's ETA is to assign pronouns. The meaning of a pronoun is a function 
which maps each of the minimal situations of the context to an individual. Such a 
function is salient, an appropriate interpretation for the context in which it appears, 
just when its values are determined in a way that reflects the information structure 
of its domain. Every proposition containing such a function must now be evaluated 
with respect to a context which is to provide these minimal situations; its meaning 
must indicate not only whether it is true or false, but also how the context which 
results from incorporating it is to be constructed. 
Let's examine exactly how Heim 's proposal works, using this simplified vari-
ant of the perennial example: 
(3). A man owns a donkey. He beats it. 
Assume that this discourse appears in isolation. The context for the first sentence 
of (3) is therefore the set of situations that contain no contingent facts--one such 
situation for each world-and the minimal situations for the first sentence serve as 
the context for the second. As always, the first sentence, the erstwhile antecedent, 
receives the translation in (4). 
(4). .3:r=iy [MAN1(1·) A DONKEY'(y) /\ OWN'(.r,y)] 
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Now note that each of the minimal situations at which (4) is true contains some 
particular individual .r0 who is a man, and similarly some donkey .1/0· For, in 
this situational logic, the verification of the complex propositions occasioned by 
existential quantifiers must proceed on the basis of the simple facts-such as 1·0 is 
a man or /lo is a donkey---0f which situations are constituted. Moreover, :ro is the 
ONLY man in that minimal situation, and !lo the only donkey. Given the precise 
delineation of situations, the extra information about any superfluous individuals 
could be stripped away yielding a smaller situation which continued to verify (4). 
The existence of .r0, yo, and their correlates renders well-defined and salient a 
function which associates with each minimal situation of (4) the unique man 
there, and a function /,1 that associates with each the donkey there. 
The second sentence will pick up these functions respectively as the interpre-
tation of he and it, as it contributes its information to the context. At each contextual 
situation. i E p(Ac), the second sentence will detennine a proposition 
(5). p(i) = (/) • I)) 
true at those extensions of I at which the man beats the donkey. Since the context 
going in to the second sentence consists of the union of the 1 's, the context going 
out should consist of the union of the p(p( 1)) 's. The set of situations which results 
is just the set of minimal situations where a man owns and beats some donkey, as is 
correct. 
This logic shows how ETA can in fact assign the correct truth-conditions to 
(3), but it is equally important to verify that these rules do not countenance any 
incorrect interpretations. Many functions can be imagined which map the minimal 
situations of (4) onto individuals. Not all of them can serve as the interpretation of 
a pronoun in the consequent. For each function, ETA must explain precisely why 
it is or is not possible. To do this, Heim herself looks to a mechanism that licenses 
an E-type function by establishing a formal, syntactic link to between it and its 
antecedent. However, the following argument suggests that salience can be given a 
precise semantic characterization that constrains the functions with which pronouns 
are interpreted to those that actual! y can occur. 
The necessary characterization depends only on two intuitively plausible man-
ifestations of respect for context. The first is that a salient function must always 
pick out an individual in a situation that the situation gives information about. The 
functions and fd do meet this requirement, since each of the situations in their 
domain contain unique facts about individuals being men or donkeys, but many 
conceivable functions do not. One such example is the function fq, which gives 
some aribitrary but fixed individual, Dan Quayle perhaps, from each of the minimal 
situations of ( 4 ). fv does not respect the information in any situation in which Dan 
Quayle is neither man nor donkey. Since the situation gives no fact on the basis of 
which to determine who Dan Quayle is, it is not the information in it that goes into 
designating Dan Quayle there. (This argument only holds, of course, as long as (3) 
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is not itself evaluated in a context from which Dan Quayle can be determined. This 
is to be expected: in such a case /Q would in fact be a perfectly good interpretation 
of the pronoun in it.) 
The second relevant dimension of respect for information ensures that a salient 
function take corresponding arguments to corresponding results. All of the minimal 
situations for (4) can be thought of as little copies of each other, since they all 
contain variants of the same three facts. By picking out an individual from each 
that is described by the same properties, .fm and .fd respect this relationship, but 
again, not all functions do this. fh, for instance, picks out the donkey in half of the 
minimal situations and the man in the other half. Because each of the situations 
looks more or less the same, there is no criterion which distinguishes the situations 
in which .h picks out a donkey on the basis of the information they contain. With 
.fh as with .fQ it is not the information in a situation that determines its value there. 
The first principle, and the reasoning which applies it to /Q, ensures that a 
function into individuals salient in the minimal situations of (4) picks out either the 
man or the donkey there. The second, and the reasoning which applies it to .h, 
ensures that a salient function, if it picks out the donkey or the man in any particular 
situation, must do so in all of them. In short, the only salient functions in this 
example are the ones that actually serve as the interpretations of its pronouns. 
The role that salience plays in restricting possibilities for anaphora informs the 
choice of working with MINlMAL situations. If pronouns applied to EVERY situation 
at which the first were true, even the two correct functions would no longer meet the 
above requirements: salience does not work if applied to constructs that contain too 
much information. For instance, in a situation which contains the same information 
about the two donkeys in it, no function that picks out a donkey is salient. Minimal 
situations don't have this problem: their partiality gives them the requisite tight, 
uniform structure. So minimal situations really are the crucial resource that makes 
ETA sensible. 
For this treatment to extend to (I), all these observations must apply to con-
ditionals. In particular, because pronoun meanings are constructed based on the 
minimal situations of the context, the definition of if must have the antecedent 
provide the context for the consequent. Heim 's definition, (6), does this. 
(6). 	 rp -+ ~· (if;;, 1·) is true just in case every minimal situation in which rp is 
true extends to a situation in which 1/· is true. 
For, indeed, just the minimal situations at which the antecedent is true will be 
considered when evaluating the consequent. In all, the E-type theory assigns to 
(1) truth conditions that can be paraphrased with-(]) is true if and only if every 
minimal situation z at which some man owns some donkey extends to a situation in 
which the man at i beats the donkey at i. 
This fixes the aspects of ETA crucial for the upcoming discussion. In ETA, 
the context is established as a set of minimal situations; pronouns are functions that 
look into the information contained in the context to choose, in a constrained way, an 
individual from each alternative that the context sets up. Two aspects of this system 
will prove distinctive: first, that minimal situations constitute a purely semantic 
representation of the meaning of some proposition, traditionally constructed; and 
second, that contextual complexity lies in the pronoun. 
2. Dynamic DRT 
In ORT, as in ETA, a context is constructed to represent alternative realizations 
of a discourse and is then used to determine reference. In ORT, however, the 
context directly encodes possibilities for anaphora instead of ETA's more general 
information. ORT describes each alternative in a context in terms of special variables 
called discourse markers which are used as the translations of pronouns. Whether 
a sentence that contains a pronoun is true or false depends on the object that is 
assigned to the corresponding discourse marker. Accordingly, sentences are always 
evaluated with respect to functions called discourse models that associate some 
entity of the world with each active discourse marker. The context for a series of 
sentences consists of all the discourse models in which it is true, and hence the 
effect of incorporating a sentence into the context is to restrict the context to those 
alternatives in which that sentence also is true. Conjunction, denoted L in this 
language, generates the function that updates the context first with the argument on 
its left and then with the one on its right. 
A new meaning for indefinites in dynamic ORT takes advantage of these 
contexts. As formulated by Groenendijk and Stokhof (1990, 1991) and Chierchia 
(1992), indefinites are translated using an unusual kind of existential quantifier, 2. 
Instead of quantifying over alternative variable assignments as usual, 2 quantifies 
over alternative discourse models to those in the context. 2 thereby expands and 
enriches the context so that all possibilities are considered for embedding the new 
variable which follows it. Because its role is to change the context, 2 does not really 
have a scope; it can bind the variable it introduces as long as that variable remains 
available. 
Operations called tests, on the other hand, close off the availability of variables 
introduced within their scope. Included in this category are 2 and=· Incorporat-
ing 2·.p into a context does not alter any elements of the context (as 2 does); it 
merely removes those discourse models which are compatible with .p. For example, 
2:r MAN'(,r) introduces the variable .r to each contextual alternative, then accepts 
only the new alternatives in which .r is assigned a man. 2[2.r MAN'(.r)] thus lets 
pass only those alternatives for which no discourse models in which .r is a man 
can be found. Subsequent reference to .r is impossible. Meanwhile, .p = 1/1 tests 
that each way of extending a discourse model so that .pis true extends in turn to a 
discourse model in which 1;• is true. Alternatives in which this is not the case are 
rejected by the test. 
It is also possible to introduce ,\-abstraction and intensional operators into this 
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logic. This ensures thac meanings can be provided for each word that specifies its 
contribution to sentence meaning. As expected, is a function that takes an 
object of the same type as T and returns the interpretation of .p when that object 
is assigned to r. If .p is a formula denoting a function to update the context, then 
'cp denotes the function from contexts to contexts associated with the meaning of 
.p. These two operations interact in a slightly surprising way. If .r is a discourse 
marker, the equivalence in (7) shows that an apparently free variable can be bound 
in an operation of ,\-conversion. 
(7). P(.r) fl 'p]('Q(.r)) =_3.r f'(.r) fl Q[.r) 
Because the • operator abstracts over discourse models, the interpretation of :r is 
'frozen' (to use Chierchia's term) exactly like the world used as the current one is 
'frozen' in the expression of intensional logic below: 
(8). Ap[OCq A vp)j('-.p) O('q A,:) 
These definitions suffice to illustrate how dynamic ORT accounts for (l). 
(1). If a man owns a donkey, he beats it. 
The translations of a man and owns a donkey look very much like their translations 
in static Montague grammar. The translation of a man might be represented as in 
(9), if .i: 1 is a discourse marker that has not previously been introduced. 
Similarly, owns a donkey would be translated as ( I 0) when rendered in terms of the 
discourse marker .r2 • 
(10). DO'.'<KEY'( .r2) fl OWN1 ( r .. rz)] 
However, because of the dynamic logic's added treatment of context, the similarity 
of these translations with Montague's is rather superficial. Thus, in (9), P is 
a DYNAMIC property, whose denotation is a function which, when provided its 
argument, returns not a truth-value but a function for updating the context. The 
meaning provided for owns a donkey is such a dynamic property. The first, when 
applied to the meaning of the second, results in (11). 
(11). 3_:r1 MAN'(.r1) fl 
This represents a function for updating a context which could be expressed in words 
as follows: Take the context and extend each discourse model there to .r 1 and .r2 in 
any way so long as the object assigned to ,r 1 is a man, and the object assigned to .r2 
is a donkey. 
The translation of the consequent is comparatively easy. Pragmatics determine 
that he is to be translated as .r1 and it is to be translated as ,r2. This decided, he 
beats it is rendered just as BEAT'( .r 1..r2 ), a test that accepts contextual alternatives 
where the individual assigned to .1·1 beats the one assigned to .r2. ( 11) and this are 
assembled using the dynamic definition of if described earlier, to yield the correct 
meaning. Symbolically, the result is ( 12). 
(12). MAN'(:!'1) .;l.1·2 DONKEY 1(.r2) 6-OWN'(.11, .r2 I]~ BEAT1(.r1 ..r2) 
The meaning of this is a function that builds a new context by considering in turn 
each of the alternative models of the old one. If every way of extending a given 
discourse model so that there is a man ..r 1, that owns a donkey, ,12, results in a 
discourse model where .r 1 beats .r2, the model is accepted. Otherwise it is rejected. 
Thus, this function narrows the context to rhe set of discourse models where, in fact, 
all men who own any donkeys beat them. 
With this idea of how ORT accounts for examples like (1), we can more 
accurately assess its differences from Heim 's ETA. By introducing new referents, 
indefinites play the principal role in ensuring that the correct possibilities for ana-
phora are constructed. Pronouns are translated simply as variables as they are in 
Montague's work. This contrasts with ETA, where indefinites receive the familiar, 
simple translation and complexity resides in the meanings assigned to pronouns, 
This might be described as a difference in DIRECTIONALITY: in ORT, sophisticated 
operarions look FORWARD, setting up referents in advance; whereas in ETA they 
look BACKWARD, determining referents when needed. A related difference is that 
in representation. DRT relies on its relatively straightforward, relatively syntactic 
mechanism of an indexed list to keep track of possible referents, where ETA uses 
a relatively abstract, relatively semantie mechanism to keep traek of information in 
general. The two issues of directionality and representation are the key ingredients 
in arguments about the treatment of disjunction in the two systems. 
3. Disjunction 
Sections I and 2 explored theoretical accounts the use of indefinite noun phrases 
in establishing connections between antecedents and consequents in conditionals. 
Here, I address the formulation of a more general theory of the way in which such 
correspondences are introduced. The data for this investigation is provided by 
conditionals in which the interpretation of the consequent parallels alternatives in 
the antecedent expressed using disjunction. 
Sentences as simple as (2), repeated below, motivate the simultaneous consid-
eration of correspondence anaphora and disjunction. 
(2). If Mary sees John or Bill, she waves to him. 
Here, as in (I), the pronoun him varies aecording to the individual chosen to realize 
the circumstances described in the antecedent. (2) asserts that when Mary sees 
John, she waves at John, and when Mary sees Bill, she waves at Bill. As always, 
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the expectation is that such similar phenomena as the correspondences set up by 
indefinites and disjunctions should derive from a common underlying origin. 
To extend earlier explanations to disjunctive cases, we will make the assump-
tion that the meaning of a sentence like (2) derives from the relatively simple 
meaning of if that we've already seen, when combined with some straightforward 
meaning for or. In static treatments of the grammar, or is accounted for using the 
simple and elegant analysis seen, among other places, in Partee and Rooth (1982). 
The idea is to provide or with a polymorphic interpretation, denoted by the infix op-
erator LJ, that can form the disjunction of two constituents of almost any type. When 
combining truth values, LJ acts exactly like the connective V; for two functions of 
the same type, LJ is defined as in ( 13). 
(13). 	 fLJg ,\u[/(u)LJg(u)] 
From the recursive step, it is clear that a function can be used in this definition only 
if it yields a truth value after taking all its arguments. Yet, expressions like names 
that usually denote individuals can combine using or as well. The simplest course in 
accounting for the disjunction there is to use Montague's translations of names like 
John and Bill: .\P[P(j )] and H'[P( b)l. These CAN be conjoined using LJ, to yield 
the appropriate >.P[ P(j) VP( b)]. For Partee and Rooth, verbs and other constituents 
shift to slightly more complex translations when these more sophisticated arguments 
are supplied to them. 
Amazingly, this polymorphic definition suffices to explain sentences like (2) 
in ETA. The meaning of or and the interpretations of John and Bill explained above 
determine the propositional formula obtained for its antecedent. It is simply: 
(14). 	 SEE'(rn, J) V SEE'( 111. b) 
Now, the logic of situations treats disjunction much like the existential quantification 
that we saw earlier: a disjunctive formula can only be satisfied in a situation in virtue 
of the truth of one of its disjuncts there. Hence, given their disjunctive specification, 
the minimal situations at which (14) is true fall into two classes. Any situation in 
one set contains Mary seeing Bill, and no other individuals or events; any in the 
other contains instead Mary seeing John, and no other individuals or events. Recall 
that an appropriate function must use the information in each of these situations to 
pick out an individual: the same concerns that dictated that we must choose the man 
or the donkey out of the situations in ( 1) dictate that we must choose either Mary or 
the person she sees out of these situations. This second function must pick out Bill 
in the first set of situations described and must pick out John in the second sort. Sure 
enough, this precisely captures the reference of him in (2). The truth-conditions, 
correct, come out as: 
(15). 	 Every minimal situation in which Mary sees Bill or John extends to a 
situation in which Mary waves at the man she sees. 
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This simple solution is possible in ETA because of the directionality and repre-
sentation of the system. ETA straightforwardly encodes the information associated 
with disjunction and lets the impact of disjunction on pronoun interpretation fall 
out from constraints placed elsewhere. Because the architecture allows pronouns 
to select their referents, there is no need to explicitly address the tricky question of 
the action of or in introducing new potential referents. The effect of or on anaphora 
cannot be finessed this way in ORT. 
Standard dynamic ORT offers two possibilities for disjunction, neither of 
which accounts for the anaphora in (2). To see why they are inapplicable, bear in 
mind that the translation of him, like the ORT translation of every pronoun, must 
be some individual variable, say .q. For this variable to refer either to Bill or to 
John, whichever is appropriate, it must be introduced in the antecedent of (2). Now, 
most frequently, or is modeled as a test, denoted as y__ This connective lets pass 
any discourse model in the context that could be truthfully continued with one of its 
arguments, but does not introduce any new models into the context. Because of this, 
no discourse markers introduced in either disjunct are available subsequently; nor 
are any new variables introduced to link referents between disjuncts. Since there is 
no way to obtain the needed .r 1, y__ is of no help in accounting for (2). 
The second interpretation of or in dynamic ORT is program disjunction, de-
noted u. The context that results from ..p u ,. ·consists of all of the discourse models 
which can be obtained by applying ; or ,.- to the current context. Thus, if cp and 
1:· introduce the same discourse marker with two different constraints, the effect of 
program disjunction is to generate a new constraint on its interpretation equivalent 
to the disjunction of those in .,:: and t•. Because it involves introducing the same 
marker in two places, program disjunction may lead to technical problems, but a 
more basic reason prevents its use here: standard formulations of dynamic DRT 
would not introduce any individual variables in interpreting either of the disjuncts 
in (2). If Bill and John have already been referred to in discourse, they will be inter-
preted using old markers, perhaps/, and). No opportunity for program disjunction 
to generate the needed .r 1 will arise in this case, because program disjunction can 
only identify newly introduced markers. 
To determine how best to resolve this difficulty, let us follow the argumentation 
of Rooth and Partee (1982).2 Rooth and Partee note the need for the disjunction 
itself to introduce a new variable in the antecedent of (2). They argue that such an 
introduction is well-motivated, because the logic of such disjunctions of individuals 
renders it equivalent to existential quantification over an explicitly specified domain. 
If the mechanism by which language realizes existential quantification is through 
dynamic variable introduction, the same method should apply in these disjunctions. 
They suggest a rule for disjunction of individuals parallel to the rule for indefinites: 
ideas rather than explicit formulations, in pan because ORT at that time did 
not incorporate the architl'.cturc necessary to implement them; the details in what follows therefore 
constitute in part my own interpretation. 
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just as a donkey introduces a variable, with the the constraint that its value be some 
donkey, A or B introduces a variable, with the constraint that its value be either 
that of A or that of B. In the notation of dynamic logic, 11 and B are dynamic 
montagovian property sets. We abstract over the variable each introduces using an 
equality property, and then indefinitely quantify over this abstraction. In symbols, 
the result of this disjunction rule with variable .r 1 is as follows: 
(16). ,\P[_::3_.ri[AC,\.r[.r = .ri]) y_ 13(',\.r[.r = .ri])] 6- • /'(.ri)] 
In (2), this disjunction applies to the dynamic properties of Bill and the dynamic 
properties of John to establish the properties of Bill or John, and a way to talk about 
Bill or John. This is exactly what we need to interpret (2). In all, we get the correct 
translation for it that is written out in ( 17). 
(17). [Jr1 (j = .r 1 y_ b = -1· 1) 6- SEE' ( 111 ..ri)] =WAVE'( 111, :ri) 
Rooth and Partee's treatment makes correct predictions for (2). However, 
more complicated examples exist which, although easy to explain in ETA, are 
accommodated within ORT only with much more complicated manipulation of 
variables than Rooth and Partee's. The added difficulty posed by these sentences 
reflects the fact that the disjunctions which they contain combine expressions of one 
category, but impact later anaphora for other types of constituents. Consider for 
instance (18): 
(18). If Mary catches a fish or John traps a rabbit, Bill cooks it. 
Here, too, the pronoun it is used to express two correspondences: when appropriate 
it refers to the fish, but when appropriate it refers to the rabbit. 
For ETA, the explanation that we use for (18) is exactly the same as the 
explanation of (2). We translate the antecedent of (18) using existential quantifiers 
and the static meaning of disjunction, to yield this result: 
(19). =J.r [CATCH'(m, .r) I\ F1SH 1(.r)] V 31; [TRAP'(). y) I\ RABBIT'(y)] 
As before, this is satisfied in minimal situations of two different kinds: each i of 
the first type contains Mary and some unique fish f 1(1 ), while each i of the second 
contains John and some unique rabbit/, (1 ). If we are to choose a function that picks 
an individual other than Mary or John from each of these situations, it must select 
f 1 ( i) or f, (I), whichever is appropriate at , . But this is exactly what the pronoun in 
the consequent does refer to: the rabbit or the fish, whichever it turns out to be. 
Rooth and Partee's rules, on the other hand, will not account for the anaphora 
if applied to (18). As always, if it is to receive a correct interpretation as x 1 in the 
consequent of (18), the variable .r 1 must be introduced in the antecedent in such a 
way as to potentially pick out either a rabbit or a fish. The rules considered earlier 
would work if the two NP's a rabbit and a fish were combined. However, the 
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sentence does not contain the explicit disjunction the two noun phrases for which 
we must introduce a variable: it joins full sentences instead. 
For sentence (18) to be correctly interpreted, then, some principle must apply 
which relates the discourse entities introduced INSIDE one disjunct to those intro-
duced in the other. This is exactly what program disjunction does, and in fact, 
program disjunction will give the correct result in this case. Suppose the indefinites 
in the two disjuncts translate in terms of the same variable .r 1, and the union of the 
contexts generated by the disjuncts is the context for the consequent. The rule for 
if then tests every assignment in which .r 1 is a fish that Mary catches and every 
assignment in which .r 1 is a rabbit that John traps, to make sure that Bill cooks 
.r 1••r 1 is the fish or the rabbit, whichever appropriate, and the correspondence is 
established. 
Unfortunately for program disjunction, examples analogous to (2) show that 
linking between disjuncts must take place when objects are referred to, as well as 
introduced: 
(20). 	 If Mary hasn't seen John lately, or Ann misses Bill, she calls him. 
(20) violates the prediction of program disjunction that as many new variables 
are available after a disjunction as are introduced in each disjunct. The disjuncts 
introduce no variables, yet two new variables are available subsequently. 
A more dramatic example of the failure of this prediction is found in the 
discourse below. 
(21 ). 	 It's interesting what happens if a man calls a woman or a woman calls a 
man. Sure, they're nervous about making the call, and they're surprised to 
get it. But even today, she waits for him to ask her out. 
With only a small amount of awkwardness, (21) manages to use pronouns corre-
sponding to all four combinations of the individuals set up in the scenario, even 
though each disjunct sets up only two discourse referents. Again, for (21) to be 
interpreted in ORT, discourse variables must be introduced at the disjunction itself. 
Indeed, (21) shows that it it is not enough for the interpretation rule for or to intro-
duce a discourse variable not corresponding to SOME pairing of variables introduced 
or referred to in each disjunct. Needed are new variables corresponding to EVERY 
such pairing. The involved procedure of establishing all these linkings represents 
a combination of the mechanisms of program disjunction and variable introduction 
we've seen earlier, plus an extension of both. 
Meanwhile, ETA as it has been already outlined captures the meanings of all 
four pronouns in (21 ). Recall that the two constraints used earlier to describe salience 
were that a salient function always picks out an individual described in a situation 
and always designates corresponding individuals in corresponding situations. Their 
application to the context set up in (21) determines first that a salient function must 
return the woman or the man in each situation, and second that its value on the 
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two kinds of situation in the context-those where the man calls the woman, and 
those where the woman calls the man-must be uniform. However, no constraint 
is placed on how the individual chosen in one kind of situation is related to the 
individual chosen in the other. This is correct. Choosing the man in the first set 
and the woman in the second gives the interpretation of the first they; choosing the 
woman in the first and the man in the second gives that of the second they; always 
choosing the woman gives the interpretation of she and her; always choosing the 
man gives the interpretation of him. Each of these functions is salient according to 
the simple definition above. 
Thus we find that ETA generalizes easily from existential quantification to 
disjunction. ORT, however, requires the implementation of an involved rule for 
disjunction that encodes through the introduction and pairing of variables the effect 
of or on later anaphora. It is worthwhile to examine the reasons why the rule for 
ORT seems so much more involved: I claim it is because ORT, to accommodate or 
must incorporate the machinery of ETA without importing the representation and 
directionality that makes that machinery sensible. 
Recall that the initial versions of ORT and ETA outlined earlier made essen-
tially identical predictions. This was because their operation was for the most part 
isomorphic. The difference is minimal between a set of discourse models and a set 
of situations paired with a set of functions from situations to individuals. To verify 
this, think of a variable, when dynamically bound by an existential quantifier of 
dynamic ORT, as a function that picks out the appropriate individual in the appro-
priate contextual alternative. Now, what we have discovered here is that the second 
notion, that of a function, generalizes easily when we must consider the effect of 
taking the union of two sets of situations. In contrast, to maintain variables, we were 
required to pair up variables and introduce new ones in their place. We motivated the 
pairing operation by examining data, but it can be motivated theoretically in terms 
of the conception of variable as function mentioned above. The functions available 
in the union of two contexts A and B ought, intuitively, to consist of any and all 
of those functions whose restrictions to A and B are functions available in those 
domains. This is how and why ETA makes the predictions it does. When variables 
approximate those functions, as in ORT, the equivalent move is pair up variables in 
each component context in all possible ways, to derive the new variables that may 
be used subsequently. This perspective reveals how ORT, extended to incorporate 
a rule to this effect, must be regarded as a recreation of the E-type theory without 
the semantic representation that informs it. 
The ORT perspective is not only derivative. Measured by the standard ofcom-
putational complexity, the strategy of ORT must also be regarded as the more costly 
one. Here complexity analysis is only a convenient and objective mathematical 
measurement to use in applying Occam's razor. Examples like (21) suggest that to 
find the appropriate interpretation for a pronoun after a disjunctive antecedent, one 
must select one out of a set of possibilities whose cardinality grows exponentially as 
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the number of disjuncts increases. 1n the ETA, salient functions can remain implicit 
until the occurrence of an anaphor requires one, so one can imagine consistently 
making a good guess about the appropriate function to use in such a way that the ex-
ponential number of possibilities was never a problem. Not so in DRT as described 
above: Each possibility must be explicitly represented in advance as a variable in a 
discourse model whose size no smart choices in interpretation can reduce. This is 
why ETA's directionality seems better suited to the problem. 
4. Extensions and Prospects 
So far, we have considered the effect of disjunction on possibilities for pronomial 
anaphora. But, as illustrated in this example, from Rooth and Partee ( 1982}, the 
alternatives introduced by or can affect anaphora of other constituents as well. 
(22}. If Mary swims or dances, then Sue does. 
On one reading, the sentence uses VP-ellipsis to calin that Sue swims or dances 
when Mary swims or dances, but on the other, the sentence asserts that when Mary 
swims and when Mary dances Sue performs the same activity Mary does. This 
latter reading suggests that context plays the same role in licensing VP-ellipsis as 
it plays in establishing the possibilities for pronomial anaphora. Investigating this 
hypothesis reinforces the arguments presented above in favor of ETA. 
In both theories, the method of constructing this parallel is clear. In ETA, 
recall that the key step is the assumption that pronouns are interpreted as salient 
functions from situations to individuals. Analogous here is the postulate that does 
has a null-complement which is interpreted as a salient function from situations to 
properties. It is more difficult to specify criteria governing the salience of properties 
in situations that those developed for the salience of individuals. However, some 
straightforward principles about the identification of a property P offer a good 
characterization. First, any property/' makes the same claim about all individuals; 
this reflects, for example, the fact that Jnhn saw Mary ascribes to John what Ann 
saw Mary ascribes to Ann. The logical behavior of/' can therefore be reconstructed 
from the behavior of the fact P( o) for any individual"· Second, the fact P( a) may 
be realized in many ways. For instance, the property of seeing someone is shown 
true of John with the fact that John saw Mary, that John saw Bill, etc. This suggests 
that a property is fully described in a context when (but only when} a complete 
catalog of the ways in which it can be shown true of an individual is provided by the 
context. Only such fully described properties should be salient; what's more, the 
property chosen at a situation i should reflect what is happening at that particular 
index. In the exam pies presented here, this can be collapsed to the constraint that 
the property chosen at i must in fact be true of some individual at i. 
These constraints identify the correct two properties for (22). The antecedent 
is translated as in (23). 
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(23). 	 SWIM'(m) V DANCE1(111) 
Again we have two kinds of minimal situation. and again we must pick out a salient 
object from each. This time we will be choosing a property from each as outlined 
above. Since the minimal situations for the property of swimming and the property 
of dancing are describable from the minimal situations of (23), any combination of 
those properties can be reconstructed. However, the property selected must hold 
of Mary in virtue of her swimming in the first kind of situation and her dancing in 
the second: for the property must be true of someone. This leaves salient the two 
functions which are actually appropriate: the function that picks out the property 
swims or dances at each index, and the function that picks out at each index the 
property swims or the property dances, whichever takes place there. When the 
complete interpretation is constructed using this second function, the meaning of 
the correspondence reading results: 
(24). 	 Every minimal situation in which Mary swims or dances can be extended 
to a larger situation either in which Sue swims or in which she dances, 
whichever Mary does in the minimal situation. 
Extending DRT to an account of these correspondence phenomena requires a 
significantly more involved extension, the beginnings of which are also to be found 
in Rooth and Partee's 1982 paper. They propose the following analogy between 
the mechanics of VP ellipsis and those of pronomial anaphora. Each time a verb 
phrase appears, it introduces a new property variable into the discourse model 
corresponding to it, just as each indefinite contributes a new individual variable. 
Does receives one of these property variables as its null complement. Rooth and 
Partee round out the parallel with a variant of the principle they used for individual 
disjunction to account for property disjunction: disjunction of verb phrases is just 
interpreted as existential quantification over a two-element set of properties. 
For example, we now translate swims and dances so that appropriate variables 
are introduced. This gives (25a) and (25b) respectively. 
(25). 	 a. Pi 'SWIM1 li. 'Pi( .r)] 
b. P2 'DANCE' li. '1'2(,r)j. 
The general rule to build a new property out of two such dynamic property meanings 
looks a lot like (16). The rule starts with the property l1, in which variable P1 is 
introduced, and the property B, in which Pi is, and gives (26). 
(26). 	 .\.::[3A(A(:)li.P1 
When this expression is incorporated into the meaning of a sentence, some new 
variable P4 is introduced which corresponds to this property in its entirety. 
Application of this procedure leaves the variables A and P4 available. This 
gives the correct predictions for (22). In the translation of the antecedent, we 
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recreate the schema in (26) with . I as in (25a) and n as in (25b ). Hence, 1'1 
contains the property swims or the property dances, whichever takes place; 1\ 
contains the property swims or dances. Since these two variables are available in the 
interpretation of the consequent, this analysis reproduces the ambiguity explained 
earlier using ETA. 
Rooth and Partee's proposal has the conceptual fault that the context main-
tained to determine the possibilities for VP ellipsis is unrelated tO the context 
maintained for pronomial anaphora. This account does hypothesize parallel opera-
tions for its two kinds of variables, but the two contexts remain distinct. In contrast, 
ETA, whose parallel operations for different kinds of anaphora are performed on 
the SAME representation, is clearly more theoretically parsimonious. 
Compounding the theoretical deficiency of DRT is an empirical difficulty with 
the proposal as it stands. Like Rooth and Partee's rule for NP disjunction, this 
procedure expects the disjuncts it combines to have the same type as the potential 
anaphors they introduce. However, disjunction has the same effect on verb phrase 
anaphora no matter what constituents arc involved. (27) is a simple example that 
illustrates the ease with which this fact falls out under ETA and the problems it 
causes for DRT. 
(27). If Mary waves at John or Bill, so does Sue. 
This sentence offers two readings analogous to those present in (22). In the first, 
Sue waves at John or Bill when Mary waves at one of them; in the second, Sue 
waves at the same person that Mary does. 
ETA does not distinguish between (22) and (27), because of its completely 
semantic representation. Substitute waving at John for swimming, waving at Bill 
for dancing, and the argument described for (22) applies at once to (27). 
No DRT rule so far considered explains the correspondence reading in this 
sentence. Its antecedent appears to introduce a VP only once, when waves at John 
or Bill is incorporated into the derivation, yet two property variables appear to be 
available in the context that follows. Additional property variables offer one method 
for resolving this difficulty. For example, John or Bill, interpreted as in (28), would 
leave the variable P1 needed to explain the correspondence ellipsis, as well as the 
variable .r 1 needed for the interpretation of pronouns, available for reference after 
the antecedent. 
(28). I'D_ V I'd ,q )] 
No principles inform the effect of predicates on context in DRT which might militate 
against this strategy: data was always the principal motivation for the introduction 
of property variables. As such, this constitutes another example of a technical 
solution in DRT best understood in light of the representations and predictions of 
ETA. 
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A second approach in ORT to the ambiguity of (27) appeals to the notion of 
scope. A property variable with value WAVE'(,r 1) can be introduced by quantifying 
in John or Bill for some variable r 1 in the antecedent after the VP contributes its 
variable to the context. Thus. the correspondence reading is obtained when wide 
scope is assigned to the disjunction. 
The correlation with scope that this predicts is in fact observed. For example, 
in (29), the use of he in the consequent forces the interpretation of the antecedent in 
which or has wide scope over all. 
(29). If every donkey chases John or Bill, he runs away. 
However, though a full treatment of the impact of scope on this problem cannot 
be presented here, the analysis below suggests that it may be more perspicuous 
to treat this consequence of scope semantically in ETA than syntactically in ORT. 
ORT's explanation is couched in terms of the formal operations chosen to model 
the effect of words on later referents. For dynamic DRT. every donkey creates a 
test which closes off the variables introduced in its scope. If it is given wide scope 
in (29), it eliminates the individual variable introduced at the disjunction needed 
to interpret the later pronoun. In contrast, ETA appeals to the meaning of every 
in its account to show directly that when every is given wide scope, the meaning 
needed to interpret the pronoun in the consequent is impossible to obtain. When 
every donkey has wide scope, the information required to verify the truth of the 
antecedent consists of an identification of all of the donkeys and a demonstration 
for each donkey either that it chases John or that it chases Bill. Any such piece 
of information yields a minimal situation for the antecedent on this reading, but 
these pieces of information do not specify any distinctive information about Bill 
or John. One way to see this is through the arguments presented earlier that rule 
out salient functions on representations which contain too much information, which 
apply again here. Some minimal situation in some possible world contains, say, 
eight equivalent donkeys of which four chase John and four chase Bill, giving the 
exact same information about the two men. A function that respects the information 
in this situation must pick out both or neither. Hence the ungrammaticality. 
Thus, verb phrase ellipsis offers a case parallel to pronomial anaphora in 
which a backward-looking semantic architecture like that of the E-Type analysis 
provides a more natural framework to describe the effect on context initiated by 
disjunction. The reconciliation between multiple kinds of anaphora ETA suggests 
makes it particularly attractive. 
I close with a word about where the argumentation presented here in favor 
of ETA might fit in. This paper instantiates a general argument used by many 
researchers in advocating purely semantic or combinatorial accounts of phenomena 
usually explained using variables. Outside DRT, variables and rules to coindex 
them typically account for problems of binding. control and agreement. For each 
of these functions there is an alternative. Szabolcsi ( 1987) shows how binding 
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of reflexives might be achieved using syntactic and semantic operations on the 
functions that the ontology of standard model-theories already provide. Dowty 
( 1985) considers the replacement of theories of control based on variable binding 
by alternatives which exploit the resources of axiomatized constraints on acceptable 
semantic models. Jacobson ( 1991) examines the use of bound pronouns in general, 
and argues that their behavior can be modeled without indexing provided that the 
meanings are assigned to pronouns and the way those meanings are combined 
proceeds appropriately. Dowty and Jacobson (I 989) and Pollard and Sag (1988) 
both emphasize the semantic rather than syntactic contribution to agreement. 
As a rule, these proposals are claimed to be superior because of their more 
successful generalization: to treat unusual cases they cover naturally (cases that 
typically include conjunction and disjunction), syntactic accounts are forced to 
import or recreate the apparatus of the semantic account-the very occurrence we 
have just found here. The arguments above to prefer the E-type analysis over DRT 
constitute a particularly complementary addition to this literature because of the 
unusual status of the variables of DRT. Unlike other variables, it is argued that 
the discourse markers of DRT are fundamental to semantics: so much so that the 
meanings of sentences are to be modeled principally as functions describing the 
assignment of values to these variables. r:inding, specifying, and arguing for an 
alternative to these strange entities is therefore a key step in constructing a grammar 
of language free from essential variables and variable binding operations. 
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